We introduce two new "degree of complementarity" measures, which we refer to, respectively, as supermodular width and superadditive width. Both are formulated based on natural witnesses of complementarity. We show that both measures are robust by proving that they, respectively, characterize the gap of monotone set functions from being submodular and subadditive. Thus, they define two new hierarchies over monotone set functions, which we will refer to as Supermodular Width (SMW) hierarchy and Superadditive Width (SAW) hierarchy, with foundations -i.e. level 0 of the hierarchies -resting exactly on submodular and subadditive functions, respectively.
Introduction
For a ground set X = [m] = {1, 2, . . . , m}, a set function f : 2 X → R assigns each subset S ⊆ X a real value. 1 Function f is monotone if f (T ) ≥ f (S), ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ X, and normalized if f (∅) = 0. In this paper, we will focus on normalized monotone set functions, which by definition are non-negative.
Like graphs to network analysis, set functions provide the mathematical language for many applications, ranging from combinatorial auctions (economics) to coalition formation (cooperative game theory; political science) [24, 25] to influence maximization (viral marketing) [23, 16] . Because of its exponential dimensionality, set functions -which are as rich as weighted hypergraphs -are far more expressive mathematically and challenging algorithmically than graphs [27] . However, when monotone set functions are submodular for any other single item. A supermodular set behaves similarly to the typical example of complements, namely complementary bundles, 2 in the sense that the set as a whole provides more complement to a single item than any of its strict subsets. However, supermodular sets have richer structures while preserving the strong complementarity of such bundles, making them potentially more challenging to deal with mathematically/algorithmically than complementary bundles of a similar size.
Our next definition focuses on additivity: Supermodular/superadditive sets correspond to witnesses that exhibit different kinds of complementarity. Supermodular sets are sensitive to the presence of an environment, and superadditive sets model complements to sets instead of items. The cardinality of the largest supermodular sets or superadditive sets provides a measure of the "level of complementarity", similar to the supermodular degree ( [9] ), the size of the largest bundle, and the hyperedge size ( [8] ) (also see Definition 11) in previous work. We will show that functions at level 0 of the above two hierarchies, respectively, are precisely the families of submodular and subadditive functions. In both hierarchies, SMW-(m − 1) and SAW-(m − 1) contains all monotone set functions over m elements. Coming back to the customer example again, we see that the utility of the customer has supermodular width of 1. Comparing to its supermodular degree of m − 1, our hierarchy characterizes this utility function at a much lower level, which matches our intuition that the complementarity of this customer's utility function should be limited. We will further show below that this difference would also have significant algorithmic implications.
Our Results and Related Work
We now summarize the technical results of this paper. Structurally, we provide strong evidence that our definitions of supermodular/superadditive sets are natural and robust. We show that they -respectivelycapture a set-theoretical gap of monotone set functions to submodularity and subadditivity. Algorithmically, we prove that our characterization based on supermodular width is strictly stronger than that of Feige-Izsak's based on supermodular degree, by establishing the following:
1. For every set function f : 2 [m] → R, SD(f ) ≤ SMW(f ), and there exists a function whose supermodular degree is much larger than its supermodular width.
2. The SMW hierarchy offers the same level of algorithmic guarantees in the maximization and auction settings as the SD hierarchy.
We will also compare both hierarchies with the MPH hierarchy of [8] .
Robustness: Capturing the Set-Theoretical Gap to Submodularity/Subadditivity
We interpret the level of complementarity in our formulation of supermodular and superadditive sets from a dual perspective: We prove that they characterize the gaps from a monotone set function to submodularity and subadditivity, respectively. Our characterization uses the following definition. 
Note that in Condition (1), the family {S ∪ T |T ⊆ T, |T | ≤ d} defines a set-theoretical neighborhood around S. Our definition of d-scopic submodularity means that even if the submodular condition f (v|T ) ≤ f (v|S) may not hold for some S ⊆ T , it holds for some set in S's d-neighborhood inside T . Thus, the parameter d provides a set-theoretical scope for examining submodularity.
Similarly, we define:
In Section 2, we prove the following two theorems. With matching supermodularity/submodularity and superadditivity/subadditivity characterization, Theorems 1 and 2 illustrate that our definitions of supermodular/superadditive sets are both natural and robust. We note that while monotone submodular functions are all subadditive, some d-scopic submodular functions are not d-scopic subadditive. As shown in Propositions 2.4 and 2.5, these two hierarchies are not comparable. We will show that they model different aspects of complementarity that can be utilized in different algorithmic and economic settings.
Expressiveness: Strengthening Supermodular Degree
We will show that our characterization based on supermodular width strengthens Feige-Izsak's the characterization based on supermodular degree [9] . The statement has two parts. We first prove, that supermodular sets extend positive dependency (as used in supermodular degree), which -in essence -can be viewed as a graphical approximation of supermodular sets. In other words, the SMW hierarchy strictly dominates the SD hierarchy. 3
Usefulness: Algorithmic and Economic Applications
We then show, algorithmically, the SMW hierarchy -while being more expressive than the SD hierarchy -is almost as useful as the latter (Theorems 8, 10 and 19).
We will illustrate the usefulness of our hierarchies in algorithm and auction design with two archetypal classes of problems, set function maximization and combinatorial auctions, which traditionally involve measures of complementarity. Motivated by previous work [9, 13, 10, 8] , we will characterize the approximation guarantee of polynomial-time set-function maximization algorithms and efficiency of simple auction protocols in terms of the complementarity level in our hierarchies. In these settings, we will compare our hierarchies with two most commonly cited complementarity hierarchies: the supermodular degree (SD) hierarchy and the Maximum over Positive Hypergraphs (MPH) hierarchy.
• Set-Function Maximization We will consider both constrained and welfare maximization. The former aims to find a set of a given cardinality with maximum function value. The latter aims to allocate a set of items to n agents, 4 with potentially different valuations, such that the total value of all agents is maximized. As a set function has exponential dimensions in m, in both maximization problems, we assume that the input set functions are given by their value oracles.
• Combinatorial Auctions and Simple Auction Protocols We will consider two well-studied simple combinatorial auction protocols: Single-bid Auction and Simultaneous Item First Price Auction (SIA). In both settings, there are multiple agents, each of which has a (potentially different) valuation function over subsets of items. The former auction protocol proceeds by asking each bidder to bid a single price, and letting bidders, in descending order of their bids, buy any available set of items paying their bid for each item. The latter simply runs first-price auctions simultaneously for all items.
Approximation Guarantees According to Supermodular Widths
We will prove that the elegant approximability results for constrained maximization by [13] and for welfare maximization by [9] can be extended from supermodular degree to supermodular width. We obtain the same dependency (see Theorems 8 and 10) -that is, 1 − e −1/(d+1) and 1 d+2 respectively -on the supermodular width d as what the supermodular degree previously provides for these problems.
Because our SMW hierarchy is strictly more expressive, our upper bounds for SMW-d cover strictly more monotone set functions than previous results for SD-d. We will also complement our algorithmic results with nearly matching information theoretical lower bounds (see Theorems 9 and 11), for these two well-studied fundamental maximization problems. Our approximation and hardness results illustrate that the SMW hierarchy not only captures a natural notion of complementarity, but also provides an accurate characterization of the "nearly submodular property" needed by approximate maximization problems.
Efficiency of Simple Auctions According to Superadditive/Supermodular Width
Next, we will analyze the efficiency of two well-known simple auction protocols in terms of superadditive width. To state our results and compare them with previous work, we first recall a notation from [8] :
Definition 10 (Closure under Maximization). For any family of set functions F over X, the closure of F under maximization, denoted by max(F), is the following family of set functions: f ∈ max(F) if and only if
We will prove the following: We will also complement our PoA results by almost tight (up to a factor of O(log m)) lower bounds:
Theorem 5. For any d > 0, there is an instance with SAW-d valuations, where the Price of Stability (PoS) of Single-bid Auction is at least d + 1 − ε for any ε > 0, and the PoA of SIA is at least d.
Although supermodular width strictly strengthens supermodular degree, superadditive width is not comparable with supermodular degree. Nevertheless, our PoA bound of O(d log m) is a factor of d tighter than the O(d 2 log m) supermodular-degree based bound of [10] for Single-bid Auction. This improvement of dependency on d, together with the nearly matching lower bound, suggests that the SAW hierarchy might be more capable in capturing the smooth transition of efficiency of simple auctions. Furthermore, as a byproduct of our efficiency results for the SAW hierarchy, we also obtain similar results, but with a worse dependency on d, for the SMW hierarchy. For Single-bid Auction, this result strengthens the central efficiency result of [10] by replacing the supermodular degree with the more inclusive supermodular width. For the PoA analysis of SIA, the the Maximum over Positive Hypergraphs (MPH) hierarchy of [8] remains the gold standard, by providing asymptotically matching upper and lower bounds. MPH is defined based on the following hypergraph characterization of set functions: Every normalized monotone set function over ground set X can be uniquely expressed by another set function h such that f (S) = T ⊆S h(T ), ∀S ⊆ X, where h(T ) for each T is called the weight of hyperedge T . Definition 11 (Maximum over Positive Hypergraphs [8] ). Let PH-d be the class of set functions whose hypergraph representation h satisfies:
MPH provides the best characterization to the efficiency of SIA as well as ties with SD and SMW regarding the approximation ratio of welfare maximization (although it requires access to the much stronger demand oracles). However, it remains open whether it can be used to analyze constrained set function maximization and Single-bid Auction. See Table 1 for a comparison.
We will prove the following theorem which states that, in general, the SAW hierarchy is not comparable with MPH. It remains open whether MPH-(d + 1) -which subsumes SD-d as a subset -contains SMW-d. In particular, the proof that SD-d ⊆ MPH-(d + 1) in [8] does not appear easily applicable to SMW-d.
Other Related Work

Set Function Maximization
There is a rich body of research focusing on set function maximization with complement-free functions, e.g. [21, 28, 7] . Various information/complexity theoretical lower bounds have been established for both problems, e.g. [20, 6, 19, 17] .
Efficiency of Simple Auctions
Single-bid Auction with subadditive valuations has a PoA of O(log m) [4] . SIA with subadditive valuations has a constant PoA [11] . Posted price auctions with XOS valuations give a constant factor approximate welfare guarantee [12] .
Other Measures of Complementarity
Some other useful measures include Positive Hypergraph (PH) [1] and Positive Lower Envelop (PLE) [8] . Eden et al. recently introduce an extensive measure which ranges from 1 to 2 m to capture the smooth transition of revenue approximation guarantee [5] .
2 Expressiveness of the New Hierarchies
Characterization of Supermodular/Superadditive Widths
We first prove Theorems 1 and 2, which characterize supermodular/superadditive widths with d-scopic submodular/subadditive functions.
As the base case, when |T | ≤ d, the inequality of (3) trivially holds because if T = T \ S, then |T | ≤ d and f (v|S ∪ T ) = f (v|T ). Inductively, assume that the statement is true for all {V ⊆ X : |V | ≤ k} for some k ≥ d. Now consider any set T with |T | = k + 1 > d. Because T is not supermodular, there is T T , such that f (v|T ) ≤ f (v|T ). Applying the inductive hypothesis on (T , S, v), we have:
.
For the other direction, we assume f is d-scopic submodular. There is no supermodular set of size larger than d, because for any 
Now assume d-scopic subadditivity. There is no superadditive set with size larger than d, because for any S and T where |T | > d and
A set function f is subadditive iff SAW(f ) = 0 (i.e., f has no superadditive set).
Supermodular Width vs Supermodular Degree
The following two propositions establish Theorem 3, showing supermodular width strictly dominates supermodular degree. 
. Thus, T is not supermodular. Since there is no supermodular set with size larger than 1 and f is not submodular, SMW(f ) = 1.
While the SAW hierarchy does not subsume the MPH hierarchy (see Proposition 2.6), we show that there is a monotone set function in the lowest layer of the SAW hierarchy (i.e. a subadditive function) and a notably high layer of the MPH hierarchy. 
Further Comparisons between Hierarchies
f is in MPH-2 since its hypergraph representation consists of only hyperedges of size 2. Now consider any u and T = X \ {u}. For any T T ,
In other words, T is both supermodular and superadditive, and SMW(f ) = SAW(f ) = m − 1.
Expanding Approximation Guarantees for Classic Maximization
In this section, we focus on the connection between supermodular width and two classical optimization problems, namely, the constrained and welfare set-function maximization. For submodular functions, greedy algorithms provide tight approximation guarantees for both problems [21, 28] . Here, we will show that simple modifications to these greedy algorithms can effectively utilize the mathematical structure underlying the supermodular degree of f , namely the SMW(f )-scopic submodularity, for any set function f . We prove that these extensions achieve approximation ratios parametrized by the supermodular width with the same dependency as the supermodular degree provides [13, 9] for both maximization problems. We complement our approximation results by nearly tight information-theoretical lower bounds.
Constrained Maximization
We first focus on cardinality constrained maximization, a problem at the center of resource allocation and network influence [23, 16, 21, 28] . Formally:
Definition 12 (Cardinality Constrained Maximization). Given a monotone set function f : 2 X → R + ∪ {0} and integer k > 0, compute a set S ⊆ X with |S| ≤ k that maximizes f (S).
We will analyze an algorithm which performs batched greedy selection, -see Algorithm 1 below -where the batch size is a function of the supermodular width of f . In particular, for an input set function, the batched greedy algorithm chooses a set of size not exceeding SMW(f ) + 1 which maximizes marginal gain, till all k elements are chosen.
Below, we show that this simple greedy algorithm provides strong approximation guarantees in terms of the supermodular width of the input function. Proof. The proof uses similar ideas to those in [13] , which are originally from [21] . Let d = SMW(f ) and (w.l.o.g.) let S * = [k] = {1, . . . , k} be an optimal solution.
=
where (4) is by the monotonicity of f , (5) is by the equivalent d-scopic submodularity of f , (6) is again by the monotonicity of f , and (7) is by the greedy property:
Because f is monotone, we have |T i | = While in general, Theorem 8 establishes a tighter approximation guarantee for the SMW hierarchy than that for the SD hierarchy, we note that in case of submodular degree, if the positive dependency graph is given, the running times are often of the form poly(n) · 2 O(SD(f )) , which can be significantly better than n O(SMW(f )) even if the submodular width SMW(f ) is much smaller than the submodular degree SD(f ).
We now provide a nearly-matching information-theoretical lower bound, suggesting that our approximation guarantee is essentially optimal. In the theorem below, the exponent k 0.99 can be replaced by any function of k in o(k). Proof. The proof is based on similar high-level ideas to those in [19] , but the detailed construction and key properties used are different. Consider a ground set X of m elements, which contains a subset R of r "special" elements. We will specify r below. We now construct a "hard-to-distinguish" function f R such that for any S ⊆ X, f R (S) = g R (|S|, I[R ⊆ S]) for a function g R : N × {0, 1} → R. In other words, f R depends on the cardinality of S and whether or not S completely contains R. For discussion below, let D = d + 1, and let c 1 and c 2 be two integers to be determined later. We set |R| = r = c 1 · D + 1. We define f R as follows:
We will use the following three properties of f R : First, consider k = (c 1 + c 2 )D. We have, for any S with |S| = k:
. To obtain an approximation ratio better than (c 1 + c 2 )/(c 1 + c 2 D) → 1/D for kconstrained maximization of f R , any algorithm must find a set with size k that contains all special elements in R. For our lower bound, we will analyze the following slightly relaxed variation of the problem: Let K = (c 1 + c 2 )D + c 2 (D − 1) − 1 > k. Find a set of size K which contains R as a subset. Note that K is the largest number where f R (S) -for |S| = K -depends on whether or not S contains R. In this case, note that the algorithm has no incentive to make queries of f R (S) for |S| < K or |S| > K, because the former reveals no more information than querying any of its supersets of size K, and the latter simply does not give any information.
We first focus on the query complexity of any deterministic optimization algorithm. Assume the algorithm makes T queries regarding S 1 , . . . , S T , where |S i | = K, ∀i ∈ [T ], which are deterministically chosen when the algorithm is fixed. We now establish a condition on T such that there is a subset R such that R ⊂ S i , ∀i ∈ [T ]. Consider the distribution where the r elements are selected uniformly at random. Let C i be the event that S i contains R. Then,
In other words, for any selections S 1 , . . . , S T ⊆ X with
, implying the deterministic algorithm with querying set S 1 , . . . , S T will not find a good approximation to f R . Let c 2 = 1 2 c 1. . Thus, we conclude that any (1/(d + 1) + ε)approximation deterministic algorithm must make at least (m/2k) k 0.99 value queries. Now consider a randomized optimization algorithm. Conditioned on the random bits of the algorithm, the above argument still works. Taking expectation of the probability of success, we see that the overall probability of success is at most T (2k/m) k 0.99 . Thus, a constant probability of success requires T = Ω (m/2k) k 0.99 . 
end return X BatchedGreedy j := Xj,i for every agent j; end
Welfare Maximization
We now turn our attention to welfare maximization. Formally:
Definition 13 (Welfare Maximization). Given n monotone set functions f 1 , . . . , f n over 2 [m] , compute n disjoint sets X 1 , . . . , X n that maximizes i∈[n] f i (X i ).
Because f 1 , . . . , f n are monotone, the optimal solution to welfare maximization is a partition of X = [m]. Thus, welfare maximization can also be viewed as a generalized clustering or multiway partitioning problem.
We will analyze the following greedy algorithm -see Algorithm 2 below -which repeatedly assigns groups of elements to agents. At each step, the algorithm picks a set of size not exceeding max i SMW(f i ) + 1 -as opposed to one -that provides the largest possible marginal gain to some agent and assigns the set to that agent.
We now prove the following approximation guarantee in terms of supermodular width.
Theorem 10 (Extending [9] ). For any collection of monotone set functions f 1 , . . . , f n over X = [m], Algorithm 2 achieves 1 2+maxi{SMW(fi)} -approximation for welfare maximization, after making O nm maxi{SMW(fi)}+1 value queries.
Proof. The proof uses similar ideas to those in [9] , which are originally from [15] . Following the notation in Algorithm 2, we use i to denote the step and j to denote the agent's index. Recall d = max j {SMW(f j )}. Suppose (X * 1 , . . . , X * n ) is an optimal solution to the welfare maximization of (f 1 , . . . , f n ). Note that ∪ j X j,i is the subset of elements that has already been assigned at the end of step i. Let T j,i = X * j \ ∪ j X j,i denote the set of elements of X * j still available at the time. Recall at step i, the set T i is allocated to agent j * i . In other words,
. According to Algorithm 2, |T i | ≤ d + 1. We now prove the following instrumental inequality to our analysis.
We divide the right hand terms according to two cases:
Thus, for any j = j * , for analysis below, let's name the d j elements in T j,i−1 ∩ T i as u
dj . Note that for j = j * , X j,i−1 = X j,i and T j,i = T j,i−1 \ u (j) 1 , . . . , u (j) dj , which implies the first equality below:
where (9) follows from the d-scopic submodularity of f j (note that u (j) k / ∈ T j,i for j = j * ), (10) follows from monotonicity of f j , and (11) follows from the batched greedy selection of Algorithm 2 that f j * i (T i |X j * i ,i−1 ) achieves the maximal possible marginal among sets of size at most d + 1. Summing over j = j * , we have:
Combining (12) and (13), we have established (8) . Now, suppose the algorithm terminates after t steps, during which at step i, subset T i is allocated to agent j * i . We have:
To show that our algorithm is nearly optimal, we prove the following information-theoretical lower bound: Similar to Theorem 9, the exponent (m/n) 0.99 in the theorem below, can be replaced by any function of m/n in o(m/n).
Theorem 11. For any d ∈ N, ε > 0, there is a family of function f 1 , . . . , f n : 2 [m] → R + with SMW(f i ) = d, ∀i ∈ [n], such that any (possibly randomized) algorithm that produces a (1/(d + 1) + ε)-approximation (with constant probability if randomized) for the n-agent welfare maximization problem makes at least Ω (n/2D) (m/n) 0.99 value queries.
Proof. This proof follows from a similar argument as the proof for Theorem 9. Consider a ground set X of m elements, which contains a family of subsets R 1 , . . . , R n of r "special" elements. We will specify r below. We construct a family of (a slightly different version of) "hard-to-distinguish" set functions, which have the same supermodular degree.
To formulate these functions, let us first consider a set R ⊆ X of r elements. We construct a function f R such that for any S ⊆ X, f R (S) = g R (|S|, I[R ⊆ S]), for a function g R : N × B → R. Like in Theorem 9, f R depends on the cardinality of S and whether or not S completely contains R. In the discussion below, let D = d + 1, and let c 1 and c 2 be functions of m and n to be determined later. We set |R| = r = c 1 D + 1. We define f R as follows:
Each instance of the n-agent welfare maximization is defined by a family of subsets R 1 , . . . , R n ⊆ X satisfying for any i = j, R i ∩ R j = ∅. The i-th agent's valuation function is then f i := f Ri .
Consider the case m = n · s for s := (c 1 + c 2 )D. We will use the following properties:
• A partition (X 1 , . . . , X n ) of X is an optimal solution to the n-agent welfare maximization problem with value functions f R1 , .
. . , f Rn if and only if X i ⊇ R i , ∀i ∈ [n]. The maximum welfare achievable is n(c 1 + c 2 D).
• Let t = c 1 D + c 2 D 2 − 1, which is the largest size of S such that f (S) is not a constant. If no agent i receives a set X i with |X i | ≤ t that is a superset of R i , then the maximum possible welfare is ns/D ≤ n(c 1 + c 2 ).
So no algorithm can -when c 1 = o(c 2 ) -achieve a better approximation ratio than [n(c 1 + c 2 )]/[n(c 1 + c 2 D)] → 1/D without finding a set X i of size at most t containing R i , for some i. We therefore reduce the analysis to a simple problem, where the goal is to find a set of size t = c 1 D + c 2 D 2 − 1 containing some R i as a subset: For each query, the algorithm can specify a set S and an index i ∈ [k], and is informedby observing f i (S) -whether S contains R i . For similar reasons as in Theorem 9, the algorithm has no incentive to make queries of f i (S) for |S| < t or |S| > t. We focus on the query complexity of any deterministic welfare optimization algorithms. Assume the algorithm makes T queries, (S 1 , k 1 ), . . . , (S T , k T ) with |S i | = t, ∀i ∈ [T ], which are deterministically chosen when the algorithm is fixed. We now establish a condition on T such that there is a family of disjoint subsets (R 1 , ..., R n ) such that R ki ⊂ S i , ∀i ∈ [T ]. Consider the distribution R 1 , . . . , R n uniformly at random conditioned on R i ∩ R j = ∅. Let C i be the event that S i contains R ki . Then,
In other words, for any queries (S 1 , k 1 ), . . . , (S T , k T ) with |S i | = t, ∀i ∈ [T ], there are disjoint subsets R 1 , . . . , R n such that R ki ⊂ S i , ∀i ∈ [T ], implying the deterministic algorithm with queries (S 1 , k 1 ), . . . , (S T , k T ), will not find a good approximation to (f R1 , . . . , f Rn ). Let c 2 = 1 2 c 1.01
1
. We have . Thus, we conclude that any (1/(d + 1) + ε)-approximation algorithm must make at least (n/2D) (m/n) 0.99 value queries. Now consider a randomized welfare optimization algorithm. Conditioned on the random bits of the algorithm, the above argument still works. Taking expectation of the probability of success, we see that the overall probability of success is at most T (2D/n) (m/n) 0.99 . Thus, a constant probability of success requires T = Ω (n/2D) (m/n) 0.99 .
Efficiency of Simple Auctions
In this section, we study the connection between the SAW hierarchy and efficiency of auctions. We will draw extensively on previous work in this area, particularly on the characterization based on the CH hierarchysee definition below -which is arguably the most simple class of set functions with complementarity.
Definition 14 (d-Constraint Homogeneous Functions [10]).
A set function f over ground set X is dconstraint homogeneous (CH-d) if there exists a valuef , and disjoint sets
, and (2) the value of every set S ⊆ [m] is simply the sum of values of contained Q i 's, i.e., f (S) = Qi⊆S f (Q i ) =f · Qi⊆S |Q i |.
We will show that previous characterization of auction efficiency [10] can be approximately extended from the CH hierarchy to the SAW hierarchy.
Backgrounds: Related Definitions and Results
We first restate a useful definition and a lemma for analyzing the efficiency of auction mechanisms. Definition 15 ([26] ). An auction mechanism M is (λ, µ)-smooth for a class of valuations F = × i F i if for any valuation profile f ∈ F, there exists a (possibly randomized) action profile a * i (f ) such that for every action profile a:
where u i (a i ; f i ) is the utility of i given action profile (a i , a −i ), OPT(f ) is the optimum social welfare given valuation profile f , and P i (a) is the payment of i given action profile a.
Lemma 4.1 ([26] ). If a mechanism is (λ, µ)-smooth then the price of anarchy w.r.t. coarse correlated equilibria is at most max{1, µ}/λ.
For Single-bid Auction and Simultaneous Item First Price Auction (SIA), we will derive our results from the following results for CH-d and MPH-d. A key concept to extend these results to other valuation classes is the following notion of pointwise approximation defined in [4] .
Definition 16 (Pointwise Approximation [4] ). A class of set functions F over ground set X is pointwise β-approximated by another class F of set functions over X if ∀f ∈ F, S ⊆ X, ∃f S ∈ F such that (1) βf S (S) ≥ f (S) and (2) ∀T ⊆ X, f S (T ) ≤ f (T ).
For example: 1 ([10] ). The class max(F) is pointwise 1-approximated by the class F.
We say a function f : 2 X → R pointwise β-approximates f :
The following lemma of [4] provides a way to translate PoA bounds between classes via pointwise approximation. [4] ). If a mechanism for a combinatorial auction setting is (λ, µ)-smooth for the class of set functions F , and F is pointwise β-approximated by F , then it is λ β , µ -smooth for the class F. And as a result, if a mechanism for a combinatorial auction setting has a PoA of α given by a smoothness argument for the class F , and F is pointwise β-approximated by F , then it has a PoA of αβ for the class F.
Lemma 4.2 (Extension Lemma
Efficiency of Simple Auctions Parametrized by SAW
Applying Lemma 4.2, we are able to translate Theorems 12 and 13 to the SAW hierarchy. Proof. Our proof is inspired by the constructions of [4] and [10] . For any f ∈ SAW-d over X = [m], we first apply the following greedy construction to obtain a partition Q = {Q i } i∈[q] of [m] into sets of size not exceeding 2d: At step i, we select a new set Q i ⊆ [m]\(Q 1 ∪· · ·∪Q i−1 ), with maximum f (Q i ), among all sets of size at most 2d.
We first prove by contradiction that there exists a function g in CH-2d which 2H m 2d -approximates f at
Note that h Q ∈ CH-2d because |Q i | ≤ 2d, ∀Q i ∈ Q. We now construct a series of functions based on h Q , and prove that for any β > 0, if there is no g among these functions that is a β-approximation of f at [m] -that is, there is no g such that (1) βg([m]) ≥ f ([m]) and (2) ∀T ⊆ [m], g(T ) ≤ f (T ), (below we will refer to this condition as Assumption (*)) -then β < 2H m 2d .
Thus, Assumption (*) with β ≥ 2H m 2d leads to a contradiction. Therefore, we have established that there exists a CH-2d function g such that (1) g([m]) ≥ 2H m 2d f ([m]) and (2) ∀T ⊆ [m], g(T ) ≤ f (T ). As in [10] , the above proof can be simply extended to prove for any S ⊆ X, there exists a CH-2d function g such that (1) g(S) ≥ 2H m 2d f ([m]) and (2) ∀T ⊆ [m], g(T ) ≤ f (T ). Essentially, we restrict the function f to 2 S , apply the argument above, and then span the obtained function back to 2 X . Therefore, SAW-d is pointwise 2H m 2d -approximated by CH-2d. We further analyze previously known hard instances to both auctions, and show that they provide almost matching lower bounds to the above two efficiency upper bounds. Proof. Consider the instance given in Theorem 2.5 of [8] . That is, a projective plane of order d + 1. There are d(d + 1) + 1 players, each desiring only a bundle of size d + 1, so the valuations of all players are in SAW-d. As shown by Theorem 2.5 of [8] SIA has a PoA of at least d + 1/(d + 1) on the above instance.
Efficiency of Simple Auctions Parametrized by SMW
As a byproduct of our efficiency results for the SAW hierarchy, we prove similar, but slightly weaker, results for the SMW hierarchy. We note that these bounds extend a central result in [10] , which states that when agents have valuations in max(SD-d ∩ SUPADD), Single-bid Auction has a PoA of O(d 2 log m).
Theorem 18 (Extending [10] ). When agents have valuations f 1 , . . . , f n ∈ max(SMW-d∩SUPADD), Singlebid Auction has a price of anarchy of at most (d+1) 2 1−e −(d+1) · H m d+1 w.r.t. coarse correlated equilibria. Theorem 19. When agents have valuations f 1 , . . . , f n ∈ max(SMW-d ∩ SUPADD), SIA has a price of anarchy of at most 2(d + 1) 2 · H m d+1 w.r.t. coarse correlated equilibria. Like Theorems 14 and 15, the two theorems above follow from Theorems 12 and 13 respectively, with the help of Lemma 4.2, Proposition 4.1, and the technical lemma below. with SMW(f ) ≤ d, we first greedily construct a partition {Q i } i of X: At step i, we select a set Q i of at most d + 1 elements from X \ (Q 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Q i−1 ) that maximizes f (Q i ). For x ∈ X, let index(x) = i iff x ∈ Q i . W.l.o.g., for analysis below, we assume that elements in X are already sorted (or are renumbered) according to their indices, i.e., if index(x) < index(y) then x < y.
Following the proof of Lemma 4.3, we focus on proving by contradiction that there exists a CH-(d + 1) function g that (d + 1)H m d+1 -approximates f . That is (1) 
Suppose this statement is not true. Letting
and starting with S 1 = [m], we can use the same iterative process to construct a sequence ((S 1 , T 1 ), . . . , (S t , T t )) for some t ∈ N such that (1) for all i ∈ [t], both S i and T i are unions of sets from Q, (2) (T 1 , . . . , T n ) is a partition of X, and (3) 
β H m d+1 , under that assumption that β is a parameter such that all induced functions (from CH-(d + 1)) satisfying (1) . For all other set S ⊆ X, we can apply a similar restricting-and-spanning-back argument with the above construction to prove that there exists a CH-(d + 1) function g such that (1) (d + 1)H m d+1 g(S) ≥ f ([S]), and (2) ∀T ⊆ [m], g(T ) ≤ f (T ).
Remarks
Further Comparative Analysis
As observed by Eden et al. [5] , the right measure of complementarity often varies from application to application. This seems to be true even with the supermodular vs superadditive widths. We note that while the SD and SMW hierarchies give nontrivial bounds on the PoA of simple auctions, SAW hierarchy seems to capture the intrinsic property needed by efficiency guarantees for simple auctions. It provides tighter characterization of PoA with a gap of log m (instead of d log m) between upper and lower bounds. On the other hand, while SMW hierarchy captures the intrinsic property needed by the constrained/welfare maximization, it remains open whether a small superadditive width provides any approximation guarantee for the two optimization problems. The MPH hierarchy takes a different approach from ours -it relies on a syntactic definition which provides elegant and intuitive structures. In contrast, both SMW and SAW hierarchies -like the SD hierarchy before it -are built on concrete natural concepts of witnesses and semantic intuition of complementarity. In the current definition, the MPH hierarchy is not an extension to submodularity or subadditivity. Rather -as shown in [8] -MPH can be considered as an extension to the fractionally subadditive (or XOS) class proposed in [18] . We therefore consider SMW, MPH and SAW parallel measures of complementarity, just like submodularity, fractional subadditivity and subadditivity in the complement-free case. One key difference is that the three hierarchies seem to diverge at higher levels of complementarity, as opposed to the fact that submodular functions are all fractionally subadditive, and fractionally subadditive functions are all subadditive. This phenomenon provides further evidence that the three hierarchies are likely to capture different aspects of complementarity. See Figure 1 for a comparison.
We also note that all upper bounds supported by our hierarchies are accompanied by almost matching lower bounds, which we consider as a justification of our definitions -they manage to categorize set functions roughly according to their "hardness" in different settings (i.e. optimization for SMW and efficiency for SAW). In contrast, while the less inclusive supermodular degree hierarchy supports a number of upper bounds, to our knowledge, none of those results are proven tight.
Final Remarks and Open Problems
Our SMW and SAW hierarchies may be applied to other problem settings. For example, for the online secretary problem based on supermodular degree [14] , we believe that with a slight modification of the algorithms and the analysis, we could replace supermodular degree with supermodular width as well for this problem; also, SMW-d functions are efficiently PAC-learnable under product distributions [29] . It may be possible to look into other venues where SMW and SAW hierarchies are applicable.
There are also a few technical questions to be answered:
• Does MPH-(d + 1) -which subsumes SD-d -include all SMW-d functions?
• Can we improve the SAW-based efficiency characterization of of Single-bid Auction and SIA to O(d)?
• Can the MPH hierarchy be used to characterize constrained set function maximization?
